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Abstract
Mechanism design is now a standard tool in computer science for aligning the incentives
of self-interested agents with the objectives of a system designer. There is, however, a fun-
damental disconnect between the traditional application domains of mechanism design (such
as auctions) and those arising in computer science (such as networks): while monetary trans-
fers (i.e., payments) are essential for most of the known positive results in mechanism design,
they are undesirable or even technologically infeasible in many computer systems. Classical
impossibility results imply that the reach of mechanisms without transfers is severely limited.
Computer systems typically do have the ability to reduce service quality—routing systems
can drop or delay traffic, scheduling protocols can delay the release of jobs, and computa-
tional payment schemes can require computational payments from users (e.g., in spam-fighting
systems). Service degradation is tantamount to requiring that users burn money, and such
“payments” can be used to influence the preferences of the agents at a cost of degrading the
social surplus.
We develop a framework for the design and analysis of money-burning mechanisms to maxi-
mize the residual surplus—the total value of the chosen outcome minus the payments required.
Our primary contributions are the following.
• We define a general template for prior-free optimal mechanism design that explicitly con-
nects Bayesian optimal mechanism design, the dominant paradigm in economics, with
worst-case analysis. In particular, we establish a general and principled way to identify
appropriate performance benchmarks for prior-free optimal mechanism design.
• For general single-parameter agent settings, we characterize the Bayesian optimal money-
burning mechanism.
• For multi-unit auctions, we design a near-optimal prior-free money-burning mechanism:
for every valuation profile, its expected residual surplus is within a constant factor of our
benchmark, the residual surplus of the best Bayesian optimal mechanism for this profile.
• For multi-unit auctions, we quantify the benefit of general transfers over money-burning:
optimal money-burning mechanisms always obtain a logarithmic fraction of the full social
surplus, and this bound is tight.
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1 Introduction
Mechanism design is now a standard tool in computer science for designing resource allocation
protocols (a.k.a. mechanisms) in computer systems used by agents with diverse and selfish interests.
The goal of mechanism design is to achieve non-trivial optimization even when the underlying
data—the preferences of participants—are unknown a priori. Fundamental for most positive results
in mechanism design are monetary transfers (i.e., payments) between participants. For example, in
the surplus-maximizing VCG mechanism [34, 7, 20], such transfers enable the mechanism designer
to align fully the incentives of the agents with the system’s objective.
Most computer systems differ from classical environments for mechanism design, such as tradi-
tional markets and auctions, in that monetary transfers are unpopular, undesirable, or technolog-
ically infeasible. It is sometimes possible to design mechanisms that eschew transfers completely;
see [32] for classical results in economics and [15, 24] for recent applications in interdomain routing.
Unfortunately, negative results derived from Arrow’s Theorem [3, 17, 31] imply that the reach of
mechanisms without transfers is severely limited.
The following observation motivates our work: computer systems typically have the ability to
arbitrarily reduce service quality. For example, routing systems can drop or delay traffic (e.g. [8]),
scheduling protocols can delay the release of jobs (e.g. [6]), and computational payment schemes
allow a mechanism to demand computational payments from agents (e.g., in spam-fighting sys-
tems [11, 10, 25]).1 Such service degradation can be used to align the preferences of the agents
with the social objective, at a cost: these “payments” also degrade the social surplus.
We develop a framework for the design and analysis ofmoney-burning mechanisms—mechanisms
that can employ arbitrary payments and seek to maximize the residual surplus, defined as the total
value to the participants of the chosen outcome minus the sum of the (“burnt”) payments.2 Such
mechanisms must trade off the social cost of imposing payments with the ability to elicit private
information from participants and thereby enable accurate surplus-maximization. For example,
suppose we intend to award one of two participants access to a network. Assume that the two
agents have valuations (i.e., maximum willingness to pay) v1 and v2 ≤ v1 for acquiring access,
and that these valuations are private (i.e., unknown to the mechanism designer). The Vickrey
or second-price auction [34] would award access to agent 1, charge a payment of v2, and thereby
obtain residual surplus v1− v2. A lottery would award access to an agent chosen at random, charge
nothing, and achieve a (residual) surplus of (v1+v2)/2, a better result if and only if v1 < 3v2. Even
in this trivial scenario, it is not clear how to define (let alone design) an optimal money-burning
mechanism.3
Our goal is to rigorously answer the following two questions:
1. What is the optimal money-burning mechanism?
1Computational payment schemes do not need the infrastructure required by micropayment schemes. One can
interpret our results as analyzing the power of computational payments, which were first devised for spam-fighting,
in a general mechanism design setting.
2We assume that valuations and burnt payments are measured in the same units. In other words, there is a known
mapping between decreased service quality (e.g., additional delay) and lost value (e.g., dollars). This mapping can
be different for different participants, but it must be publicly known and map onto [0,∞). See Section 6 for further
discussion.
3Indeed, it follows from our results that in some settings lotteries are optimal (i.e., money-burning is useless); in
others, Vickrey auctions are optimal; and sometimes, neither is optimal.
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2. How much more powerful are mechanisms with monetary transfers than money-burning mech-
anisms?
Our Results. Our first contribution is to identify a general template for prior-free (i.e., worst-
case) optimal mechanism design. The basic idea is to characterize the set of mechanisms that are
Bayesian optimal for some i.i.d. distribution on valuations, and then define a prior-free performance
benchmark that corresponds to competing simultaneously with all of these on a fixed (worst-case)
valuation profile. The template, which we detail below, is general and we expect it to apply in
many mechanism design settings beyond money-burning mechanisms.
Second, we characterize Bayesian optimal money-burning mechanisms—the incentive-compatible
mechanisms with maximum-possible expected residual surplus. Our characterization applies to gen-
eral single-parameter agents, meaning that the preferences of each agent is naturally summarized
by a single real-valued valuation, with independent but not necessarily identically distributed val-
uations. The characterization unifies results in the economics literature [5, 26] and also extends
them in two important directions. First, the results in [5, 26] concern only multi-unit auctions,
where k identical units of an item can be allocated to agents who each desire at most one unit. Our
characterization applies to the general, possibly asymmetric, setting of single-parameter agents; for
example, agents could be seeking disjoint paths in a multicommodity network.4 In addition, for
multi-unit auctions, we give a simple description of the optimal mechanism even when the “hazard
rate” of the valuation distribution is not monotone in either direction. This important case is the
most technically interesting and challenging one, and it has not been considered in detail in the
literature.
Third, for multi-unit auctions, we design a mechanism that is approximately optimal in the
worst case. We derive our benchmark using our characterization of Bayesian optimal mechanisms
restricted to i.i.d. valuations and symmetric mechanisms. We prove that such mechanisms are
always well approximated by a k-unit p-lottery, defined as follows: order the agents randomly,
sequentially make each agent a take-it-or-leave-it offer of p, and stop after either k items have
been allocated or all agents have been considered. This result reduces the design of a constant-
approximation prior-free money-burning mechanism to the problem of approximating the residual
surplus achieved by the optimal k-unit p-lottery. Our prior-free mechanism obtains a constant
approximation of this benchmark using random sampling to select a good value of p. Surprisingly,
we accomplish this even when k is very small (e.g., k = 1).5 Our benchmark definition ensures that
such a guarantee is strong: for example, if valuations are drawn from some unknown i.i.d. distribu-
tion F, our mechanism obtains a constant fraction of the expected residual surplus of an optimal
mechanism tailored specifically for F.
Finally, for multi-unit auctions, we provide a price-of-anarchy-type analysis that measures the
social cost of burnt payments. Recall that the full surplus is achievable with monetary transfers
using the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. We prove that the largest-possible relative
loss in surplus due to money-burning is precisely logarithmic in the number of participants, in both
the Bayesian and worst-case settings. Indeed, our near-optimal money-burning mechanism always
obtains residual surplus within a logarithmic factor of the full surplus. This result suggests that the
4Multi-unit auctions model symmetric situations, as when each agent seeks a path from a common source s to a
common destination t; here, the number k of units equals the number of edges in a minimum s-t cut.
5Previous experience with prior-free mechanism design, e.g., for digital goods, suggests that conditions like “two
or more winners” might be necessary to achieve a constant approximation. See Section 6 for further discussion.
3
cost of implementing money-burning (e.g., computational payments) rather than general transfers
(e.g., micropayments) in a system is relatively modest. Further, our positive result contrasts with
the linear lower bound that we prove on the fraction of the full surplus obtainable by mechanisms
without any kind of payments.
A Template for Prior-Free Auction Design. The following template forges an explicit con-
nection between the Bayesian analysis of Bayesian optimal mechanism design, the dominant ap-
proach in economics, and the worst-case analysis of prior-free optimal mechanism design, the ubiq-
uitous approach in theoretical computer science. Its goal is to fill a fundamental gap in prior-free
optimal mechanism design methodology: the selection of an appropriate performance benchmark.
1. Characterize the Bayesian optimal mechanism for every i.i.d. valuation distribution.
2. Interpret the behavior of the symmetric, ex post incentive compatible, Bayesian optimal
mechanism for every i.i.d. distribution on an arbitrary valuation profile to give a distribution-
independent benchmark.
3. Design a single ex post incentive compatible mechanism that approximates the above bench-
mark on every valuation profile; the performance ratio of such a mechanism provides an upper
bound on that of the optimal prior-free mechanism.
4. Obtain lower bounds on the best performance ratio possible in this framework by exhibiting a
distribution over valuations such that the ratio between the expected value of the benchmark
and the performance of the Bayesian optimal mechanism for the given distribution is large.
In hindsight, this approach has been employed implicitly in the context of (profit-maximizing)
digital good auctions [19, 18]. However, the simplicity of the digital good auction problem obscures
the importance of the first two steps, as the Bayesian optimal digital good auction is trivial: offer a
posted price. For money-burning mechanisms, the benchmark we identify in Step 2 is not a priori
obvious.
Further Related Work. McAfee and McMillan study collusion among bidders in multi-unit
auctions [26]. In a weak cartel, where the agents wish to maximize the cartel’s total utility but
are not able to make side payments amongst themselves, payments made to the auctioneer are
effectively burnt. The optimization and incentive problem faced by the grand coalition in a multi-
unit auction is similar to the auctioneer’s problem in our money-burning setting; therefore, results
for weak cartels follow from similar analyses to ours [26, 9].
Our characterization of Bayesian optimal money-burning mechanisms builds on analysis tools
developed for profit maximization in Bayesian settings (see Myerson [28] and Riley and Samuel-
son [29]) that apply in general single parameter settings (see, e.g., [22]). Independently from our
work, Chakravarty and Kaplan [5] describe the optimal Bayesian auction in multi-unit money-
burning settings. Our work extends this analysis to general single-parameter agent settings with
explicit focus on the case where the hazard rate is not monotone in either direction. Our paper is
the first to study the relative power of money-burning mechanisms and mechanisms with or without
transfers. It is also the first to consider prior-free money-burning mechanisms.
Our results that quantify the benefit of transfers have analogs in the price of anarchy literature,
specifically in the standard (nonatomic) model of selfish routing (e.g. [30]). Namely, full efficiency is
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achievable in this model with general transfers, in the form of “congestion prices”; without transfers
the outcome is a Nash equilibrium, with inefficiency measured by the price of anarchy; and with
burnt transfers (“speed bumps” or other artificial delays) it is generally possible to recover some
but not all of the efficiency loss at equilibrium [8].
There are several other studies that view transfers to an auctioneer as undesirable; however,
these works are technically unrelated to ours. We already noted recent work on incentive-compatible
interdomain routing without payments [15, 24]. Moulin [27] and Guo and Conitzer [21] indepen-
dently studied how to redistribute the payments of the VCG mechanism in a multi-unit auction
among the participants (using general transfers) to minimize the total payment to the auctioneer.
Finally, as already mentioned, our prior-free techniques are related to recent work on profit max-
imization (e.g., [19, 16, 4]) and there is a related literature on the problem of cost minimization,
a.k.a. frugality (e.g., [2, 33, 12, 23]).
2 Bayesian Optimal Money Burning
In this section we study optimal money-burning mechanism design from a standard economics
viewpoint, where agent valuations are drawn from a known prior distribution. This will complete
the first step of our template for prior-free optimal mechanism design.
Mechanism design basics. We consider mechanisms that provide a good or service to a subset
of n agents. The outcome of such a mechanism is an allocation vector, x = (x1, . . . , xn), where xi
is 1 if agent i is served and 0 otherwise, and a payment vector, p = (p1, . . . , pn). In this paper,
the payment pi is the amount of money that agent i must “burn”. We allow the set of feasible
allocation vectors, X , to be constrained arbitrarily; for example, in a multi-unit auction with k
identical units of an item, the feasible allocation vectors are those x ∈ X with
∑
i xi ≤ k.
We assume that each agent i is risk-neutral, has a privately known valuation vi for receiving
service, and aims to maximize their (quasi-linear) utility, defined as ui = vixi − pi. We denote the
valuation profile by v = (v1, . . . , vn).
Our mechanism design objective is to maximize the residual surplus, defined as
∑
i
(vixi − pi)
for a valuation profile v, a feasible allocation x, and payments p. If the payments were transferred
to the seller then the resulting social surplus would be
∑
i vixi; however, in our setting the payments
are burnt and the social surplus is equal to the residual surplus.
Bayesian mechanism design basics. In this section, we assume that the agent valuations are
drawn i.i.d. from a publicly known distribution with cumulative distribution function F (z) and
probability density function f(z). We let F denote the joint (product) distribution of agent values.
See Section 6 for a generalization to general product distributions.
We consider the problem of implementation in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Agent i’s strategy is a
mapping from their private value vi to a course of actions in the mechanism. The distribution on
valuations F and a strategy profile induce a distribution on agent actions. These agent actions are in
Bayes-Nash equilibrium if no agent, given their own valuation and the distribution on other agents’
actions, can improve its expected payoff via alternative actions. By the revelation principle [28],
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we can restrict our attention to single round, sealed bid, direct mechanisms in which truthtelling,
i.e., submitting a bid bi equal to the private value vi, is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. It will turn out
that there is always an optimal mechanism that is not only Bayesian incentive compatible but also
dominant strategy incentive compatible, meaning truthtelling is an optimal agent strategy for every
strategy profile of the other agents.
An allocation rule, x(v), is the mapping (in the truthtelling equilibrium) from agent valua-
tions to the outcome of the mechanism. Similarly the payment rule, p(v), is the mapping from
valuations to payments. Given an allocation rule x(v), let xi(vi) be the probability that agent i is al-
located when its valuation is vi (over the probability distribution on the other agents’ valuations):
xi(vi) = Ev−i [xi(vi,v−i)] . Similarly define pi(vi). Positive transfers from the mechanism to the
agents are not allowed and we require ex interim individual rationality (i.e., that non-participation
in the mechanism is an allowable agent strategy). The following lemma is the standard characteri-
zation of the allocation rules implementable by Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms and the
accompanying (uniquely defined) payment rule.
Lemma 2.1 [28] Every Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism satisfies:
1. Allocation monotonicity: for all i and vi > vi
′, xi(vi) ≥ xi(vi
′).
2. Payment identity: for all i and vi, pi(vi) = vixi(vi)−
∫ vi
0 xi(v)dv.
Virtual valuations. Assume for simplicity that the distribution F has support [a, b] and positive
density throughout this interval. Myerson [28] defined “virtual valuations” and showed that they
characterize the expected payment of an agent in a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism.
Definition 2.2 (virtual valuation for payment [28]) If agent i’s valuation is distributed ac-
cording to F , then its virtual valuation for payment is
ϕ(vi) = vi −
1−F (vi)
f(vi)
.
Lemma 2.3 [28] In a Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism with allocation rule x(·), the ex-
pected payment of agent i satisfies
Ev[pi(v)] = Ev[ϕ(vi)xi(v)] .
Myerson uses this correspondence to design optimal mechanisms for profit-maximization. The
optimal mechanism for a given distribution is the one that maximizes the virtual surplus (for
payment).
Definition 2.4 (virtual surplus) For virtual valuation function ϕ(·) and valuations v, the vir-
tual surplus of allocation x is ∑
i
ϕ(vi)xi.
Our objective is to maximize the residual surplus,
∑
i(vixi(v) − pi(v)), which we can do quite
easily using virtual valuations. To justify our terminology, below, notice that an agent’s utility
is ui(v) = vixi(v) − pi(v), and our objective of residual surplus maximization is simply that of
maximizing the expected utility of the agents, Ev[
∑
i ui(v)]. We define a virtual valuation for
utility by simply plugging in the virtual valuation for payments into the equation that defines
utility.
6
Definition 2.5 (virtual valuation for utility) If agent i’s valuation is distributed according to
F , then its virtual valuation for utility is
ϑ(vi) =
1−F (vi)
f(vi)
.
This quantity is also known as the “information rent” or “inverse hazard rate function”. Treating
it as a virtual valuation of sorts, we can generalize the theory of optimization by virtual valuations,
beginning with the following lemma.
Lemma 2.6 In a Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism with allocation rule x, the expected
utility of agent i satisfies
Ev[ui(v)] = Ev[ϑ(vi)xi(v)] .
We can conclude from this that the Bayesian optimal mechanisms for residual surplus are
precisely those that maximize the expected virtual surplus (for utility) subject to feasibility and
monotonicity of the allocation rule. In other words, we should choose a feasible allocation vector
x(v) to maximize
∑
i ϑ(vi)xi(v) for each v, subject to monotonicity of xi(vi). It is easy to see that
if ϑ(·) is monotone non-decreasing in vi, then choosing
x(v) ∈ argmaxx′∈X
∑
i
ϑ(vi)xi
′
results in a monotone allocation rule. Unfortunately ϑ(·) is often not monotone non-decreasing;
indeed, under the standard “monotone hazard rate” assumption, discussed further below, ϑ(·) is
monotone in the wrong direction.
Ironing. We next generalize an “ironing” procedure of Myerson [28] that transforms a possibly
non-monotone virtual valuation function into an ironed virtual valuation function that is monotone;
the optimization approach of the previous paragraph can then be applied to these ironed functions
to obtain a monotone allocation rule. Further, the ironing procedure preserves the target objective,
so that an optimal allocation for the ironed virtual valuations is equal to the optimal monotone
allocation for the original virtual valuations.
Definition 2.7 (ironed virtual valuations [28]) Given a distribution function F (·) with virtual
valuation (for utility) function ϑ(·), the ironed virtual valuation function, ϑ¯(·), is constructed as
follows:
1. For q ∈ [0, 1], define h(q) = ϑ(F−1(q)).
2. Define H(q) =
∫ q
0 h(r)dr.
3. Define G as the convex hull of H — the largest convex function bounded above by H for all
q ∈ [0, 1].
4. Define g(q) as the derivative of G(q), where defined, and extend to all of [0, 1] by right-
continuity.
5. Finally, ϑ¯(z) = g(F (z)).
Step 4 of Definition 2.7 makes sense because G is convex function. Convexity of G also implies
that g, and hence ϑ¯, is a monotone non-decreasing function.
The proof Myerson gives for ironing virtual valuations for payments extends simply to any
other kind of virtual valuation including our virtual valuations for utility. We summarize this in
Lemma 2.8 with a proof in Appendix A.
Lemma 2.8 Let F be a distribution function with virtual valuation function ϑ(·) and x(v) a mono-
tone allocation rule. Define G, H, and ϑ¯ as in Definition 2.7. Then
Ev[ϑ(vi)xi(v)] ≤ Ev
[
ϑ¯(vi)xi(v)
]
, (1)
with equality holding if and only if ddvxi(v) = 0 whenever G(F (v)) < H(F (v)).
Our main theorem now follows easily.
Theorem 2.9 Let F be a distribution function with virtual valuation function ϑ(·). Define G, H,
and ϑ¯ as in Definition 2.7. For valuation profiles drawn from distribution F, the mechanisms that
maximize the expected residual surplus are precisely those satisfying
1. x(v) ∈ argmaxx′∈X
∑
i ϑ¯(vi)xi
′ for every v; and
2. for all i, ddvxi(v) = 0 whenever G(F (v)) < H(F (v)).
Proof: First, there exists a mechanism that satisfies both of the desired properties. To see this,
consider an allocation rule that maximizes
∑
i ϑ¯(vi)xi(v) for every v. Such a rule can without loss of
generality be a function only of ϑ¯(vi) and not of vi directly. At points v where G(F (v)) < H(F (v)),
G is locally linear (since it is the convex hull of H) and hence ϑ¯(v) is locally constant. Thus such
an allocation rule will satisfy ddvxi(v) = 0 at all such points (for all i).
A mechanism that meets both conditions simultaneously maximizes the right-hand side of (1)
while satisfying the inequality with equality. Lemmas 2.6 and 2.8 imply that such a mechanism
maximizes the expected residual surplus and, conversely, that all optimal mechanisms must meet
both conditions. ✷
Theorem 2.9 shows that maximizing the ironed virtual surplus (for utility) is equivalent to
maximizing expected residual surplus subject to incentive-compatibility. Different tie-breaking rules
can yield different optimal mechanisms. With symmetric participants (that is, i.i.d. valuations) and
a symmetric feasible region (e.g., k-item auctions), it is natural to consider symmetric mechanisms,
and these will play a crucial role in our benchmark for prior-free money-burning mechanisms (see
Definition 3.1).
Interpretation. To interpret Theorem 2.9, recall that the hazard rate of distribution F at v
is defined as f(v)1−F (v) . The monotone hazard rate (MHR) assumption is that the hazard rate is
monotone non-decreasing and is a standard assumption in mechanism design (e.g. [28]). We will
analyze this standard setting (MHR), the setting in which the hazard rate is monotone in the
opposite sense (anti-MHR), and the setting where it is neither monotone increasing nor decreasing
(non-MHR). Notice that the hazard rate function is precisely the reciprocal virtual valuation (for
utility) function. Our interpretation is summarized by Figure 1.
When the valuation distribution satisfies the MHR condition, the ironed virtual valuations (for
utility) have a special form: they are constant with value equal to their expectation.
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MHR nonMHR antiMHR
(e.g., uniform) (e.g., bimodal) (e.g., super-exponential)
ϑ¯(v) ϑ¯(v) ϑ¯(v)
Lottery is optimal. indirect Vickrey is optimal. Vickrey is optimal.
Figure 1: Ironed virtual residual surplus in the three cases.
Lemma 2.10 For every distribution F that satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition, the ironed
virtual valuation (for utility) function is constant with ϑ¯(z) = µ, where µ denotes the expected value
of the distribution.
Proof: Apply the ironing procedure from Definition 2.7 to ϑ(z). The monotone hazard rate
condition implies that ϑ(z) is monotone non-increasing. Since F (z) is monotone non-decreasing so
is F−1(q) for q ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, h(q) = ϑ(F−1(q)) is monotone non-increasing. The integral H(q)
of the monotone non-increasing function h(q) is concave. The convex hull G(q) of the concave
function H(q) is a straight line. In particular, H(q) is defined on the range [0, 1], so G(q) is the
straight line between (0,H(0)) and (1,H(1)). Thus, g(q) is the derivative of a straight line and
is therefore constant with value equal to the line’s slope, namely H(1). Thus, ϑ¯(z) = H(1). It
remains to show that H(1) = µ. By definition,
H(1) =
∫ 1
0
ϑ(F−1(q))dq.
Substituting q = F (z), dq = f(z)dz, and the support of F as (a, b), we have
H(1) =
∫ b
a
ϑ(z)f(z)dz.
Using the definition of ϑ(·) and the definition of expectation for non-negative random variables
gives
H(1) =
∫ b
a
(1− F (z))dz = µ.
✷
Therefore, under MHR the mechanism that maximizes the ironed virtual surplus is the one
that maximizes the ex ante expected surplus, without asking for bids and without any transfers.
For example, in a multi-unit auction with i.i.d. bidders, all agents are equal ex ante, and thus any
allocation rule that ignores the bids and always allocates all k units (charging nothing) is optimal.
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Corollary 2.11 For agents with i.i.d. valuations satisfying the MHR condition, an optimal (sym-
metric) money-burning mechanism for allocating k units is a k-unit lottery.
Suppose the distribution satisfies the anti-MHR condition which implies that the virtual val-
uation (for utility) functions are monotone non-decreasing. The ironed virtual valuation function
is then identical to the virtual valuation function. The i.i.d. assumption implies that all agents
have the same virtual valuation function, so the agents with the highest virtual valuations are
also the agents with the highest valuations. Therefore, an optimal money-burning mechanism for
allocating k units assigns the units to the k agents with the highest valuations.6 This is precisely
the allocation rule used by the k-unit Vickrey auction [34], so the truthtelling payment rule is that
all winners pay the k + 1st highest valuation.
Corollary 2.12 For agents with i.i.d. valuations satisfying the anti-MHR condition, an optimal
(symmetric) money-burning mechanism for allocating k units is a k-unit Vickrey auction.
To optimally allocate k units of an item in the non-MHR case, we simply award the items to the
agents with the largest ironed virtual valuations (for utility). Ironed virtual valuations are constant
over regions in which non-trivial ironing takes place, resulting in potential ties among players with
distinct valuations. The allocation rule of an optimal mechanism cannot change over ironed regions
(Lemma 2.8), so we cannot break ties among ironed virtual valuations in favor of agents with higher
valuations. We can break these ties arbitrarily (e.g., based on a predetermined total ordering of
the agents) or randomly. In either case the optimal mechanism can be described succinctly as an
indirect generalization of the k-unit Vickrey auction where the bid space is restricted to be intervals
in which the ironed virtual valuation function is strictly increasing. The k agents with the highest
bids win and ties are broken in a predetermined way. Payments in this mechanism are given by
Lemma 2.1 and are described in more detail for this case in the next section.
Corollary 2.13 For agents with i.i.d. non-MHR valuations, an optimal (symmetric) money-burning
mechanism for allocating k units is an indirect k-unit Vickrey auction: for valuations in the range
R = [a, b] and subrange R′ ⊂ R on which ϑ¯(v) has positive slope, it is the indirect mechanism where
agents bid bi ∈ R
′ and the k agents with the highest bids win, with ties broken uniformly at random.
3 Prior-Free Money-Burning Mechanism Design
We now depart from the Bayesian setting and design near-optimal prior-free mechanisms for multi-
unit auctions. Section 3.1 corresponds to the second step in our prior-free mechanism design
template and leverages our characterization of Bayesian optimal mechanisms to identify a simple,
tight, and distribution-independent performance benchmark. Section 3.3 gives a prior-free mech-
anism that, for every valuation profile, obtains expected residual surplus within a constant factor
of this benchmark. This mechanism implements the third step of our design template. We con-
sider lower bounds on the approximation ratio of all prior-free mechanisms (the final step of the
template) in Section 4.
6Virtual valuations need not be strictly increasing, so two bidders with different valuations may have identical
virtual valuations. In the anti-MHR case, it is permissible to break ties in favor of the agent with the highest valuation.
In the notation of Lemma 2.8, G = H throughout [0, 1], so the tie-breaking rule does not affect the expected residual
surplus.
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For ease of discussion the payment rules we describe in this section are for mechanism imple-
mentations that are dominant strategy incentive compatible for agents that are risk-neutral with
respect to randomization in the mechanism, i.e., mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. All
of these mechanisms have natural implementations with payment rules that make them dominant
strategy incentive compatible for any fixed outcome of the mechanism’s random decisions, i.e.,
mechanisms that are truthful all the time. In the computer science literature, discussion of these
distinctions can be found in [1].
3.1 A Performance Benchmark for Prior-Free Mechanisms
Intuitively, our performance benchmark for a valuation profile is the maximum residual surplus
achieved by a symmetric mechanism that is optimal for some i.i.d. distribution. The next definition
formalizes the class of mechanisms that define the benchmark.
Definition 3.1 (OptF) For an i.i.d. distribution F with ironed virtual valuation (for utility) func-
tion ϑ¯, the mechanism OptF is defined as follows.
1. Given v, choose a feasible allocation maximizing
∑
i ϑ¯(vi)xi. If there are multiple such allo-
cations, choose one uniformly at random.
2. Let x denote the corresponding allocation rule, with xi(v) denoting the probability that player i
receives an item given the valuation profile v. Let p denote the (unique) payment rule dictated
by Lemma 2.1.
3. Given valuations v and the random choice of allocation in the first step, charge each winner i
the price pi(v)/xi(v) and each loser 0.
By Theorem 2.9, OptF maximizes the expected residual surplus for valuations drawn from F.
Using Lemma 2.1, it is also incentive-compatible and ex post individually rational. It is symmetric
provided the set of feasible allocations is symmetric (i.e., is a k-item auction). In this case, the first
step awards the k items to the bidders with the top k ironed virtual valuations (for utility) with
respect to the distribution F, breaking ties uniformly at random.
Our benchmark is then:
G(v) = supFOptF(v), (2)
where OptF(v) denotes the expected residual surplus (over the choice of random allocation) ob-
tained by the mechanism OptF on the valuation profile v. This benchmark is, by definition,
distribution-independent. As such, it provides a yardstick by which we can measure prior-free
mechanisms: we say that a (randomized) mechanism β-approximates the benchmark G if, for every
valuation profile v, its expected residual surplus is at least G(v)/β. Note the strength of this guar-
antee: for example, if a mechanism β-approximates the benchmark G, then on any i.i.d. distribution
it achieves at least a β fraction of the expected residual surplus of every mechanism. Naturally, no
prior-free mechanism is better than 1-approximate; we give stronger lower bounds in Section 4.
Remark. Restricting attention in Definition 3.1 to optimal mechanisms that use symmetric tie-
breaking rules is crucial for obtaining a tractable benchmark. For example, when F is an i.i.d.
distribution satisfying the MHR assumption, Theorem 2.9 implies that every constant allocation
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rule that allocates all items (with zero payments) is optimal (recall Corollary 2.11). For a single-
item auction and a valuation profile v, say with the first bidder having the highest valuation,
the mechanism that always awards the good to the first bidder and charges nothing achieves the
full surplus. (Of course, this mechanism has extremely poor performance on many other valuation
profiles.) As no incentive-compatible money-burning mechanism always achieves a constant fraction
of the full surplus (see Proposition 5.1), allowing arbitrary asymmetric optimal mechanisms to
participate in (2) would yield an unachievable benchmark.
3.2 Multi-Unit Auctions and Two-Price Lotteries
The definition of G in (2) is meaningful in general single-parameter settings, but appears to be
analytically tractable only in problems with additional structure, symmetry in particular. We next
give a simple description of this benchmark, and an even simpler approximation of it, for multi-unit
auctions.
What does OptF look like for such problems? When the distribution on valuations satisfies the
MHR assumption, OptF is a k-unit lottery (cf., Corollary 2.11). Under the anti-MHR assumption,
OptF is a k-unit Vickrey auction (cf., Corollary 2.12). We can view the k-unit Vickrey auction, ex
post, as a k-unit v(k+1)-lottery, where v(k+1) is the k+1st highest valuation, in the following sense.
Definition 3.2 (k-unit p-lottery) The k-unit p-lottery, denoted Lotp, allocates to agents with
value at least p at price p. If there are more than k such agents, the winning agents are selected
uniformly at random.
One natural conjecture is that, ex post, the outcome of every mechanism of the form OptF on a
valuation profile v looks like a k-unit p-lottery for some value of p. For non-MHR distributions F,
however, OptF can assume the more complex form of a two-price lottery, ex post.
Definition 3.3 (k-unit (p, q)-lottery) A k-unit (p, q)-lottery, denoted Lotp,q, is the following
mechanism. Let s and t denote the number of agents with bid in the range (p,∞) and (q, p],
respectively.
1. If s ≥ k, run a k-unit p-lottery on the top s agents.
2. If s+ t ≤ k, sell to the top s+ t agents at price q.
3. Otherwise, run a (k − s)-unit q-lottery on the agents with bid in (q, p] and allocate each of
the top s agents a good at the price dictated by Lemma 2.1: k−s+1t+1 q +
s+t−k
t+1 p.
We now prove that for every i.i.d. distribution F and every valuation profile v, the mechanism
OptF results in an outcome and payments that, ex post, are identical to those of a k-unit (p, q)-
lottery.
Lemma 3.4 For every valuation profile v, there is a k-unit (p, q)-lottery with expected residual
surplus G(v).
Proof: By definition (2), we only need to show that, for every i.i.d. distribution F and valuation
profile v, OptF(v) has the same outcome as a k-unit (p, q)-lottery.
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Fix F and v, and assume that v1 ≥ · · · ≥ vn. Thus, ϑ¯(v1) ≥ · · · ≥ ϑ¯(vn). Recall by Definition 3.1
that OptF maximizes
∑
i ϑ¯(vi)xi and breaks ties randomly. Define S = {i : ϑ¯(vi) > ϑ¯(vk+1)},
T = {i : ϑ¯(vi) = ϑ¯(vk+1)}, s = |S|, and t = |T |. Assume we are in the more technical case that
0 < s < k < s + t (the other cases follow from similar arguments). It is easy to see that OptF
assigns a unit to each bidder in S and allocates the remaining k−s units randomly to bidders in T .
Let q = inf{v : ϑ¯(v) = ϑ¯(vk+1)} and p = inf{v : ϑ¯(v) > ϑ¯(vk+1)}. The allocation is thus identical
to a k-unit (p, q)-lottery. It remains to show that the payments are correct.
Let xi(·) be as in Definition 3.1. Consider agent i ∈ T . If i bids below q then i loses, while
if i bids at least q then i wins with the same probability as when i bids vi. Therefore, xi(v) for
v ≤ vi is step function at v = q. Thus, pi(vi) = vixi(vi)−
∫ vi
0 xi(v)dv = qxi(vi) and i’s payment on
winning is pi(vi)/xi(vi) = q, as in the k-unit (p, q)-lottery. Now consider an agent i ∈ S. If i were
to bid v < q, i would lose, i.e., xi(v) = 0. If i were to bid v ∈ [q, p) then i would leave the set S of
agents guaranteed a unit, and would join the set T , making t+1 agents who would share s− k+1
remaining items by lottery. In this case, xi(v) =
s−k+1
t+1 . Of course, xi(v) = 1 when v > p. As xi(·)
is identical to the allocation function for agent i in the k-unit (p, q)-lottery, the payments are also
identical. ✷
As we have seen, mechanisms of the form OptF can produce outcomes not equivalent to that of
a single-price lottery. Our next lemma shows that k-unit p-lotteries give 2-approximations to k-unit
(p, q)-lotteries. This allows us to relate the performance of single-price lotteries to our benchmark
(Corollary 3.6), which will be useful in our construction of an approximately optimal prior-free
mechanism in the next section.
Lemma 3.5 For every valuation profile v and parameters k, p, and q, there is a p′ such that the
k-unit p′-lottery obtains at least half of the expected residual surplus of the k-unit (p, q)-lottery.
Proof: We prove the lemma by showing that Lotp,q(v) ≤ Lotp(v) + Lotq(v). We argue the
stronger statement that each agent enjoys at least as large a combined expected utility in Lotp(v)
and Lotq(v) as in Lotp,q(v).
Let S and T denote the agents with values in the ranges (p,∞) and (q, p], respectively. Let
s = |S| and t = |T |. Assume that 0 < s < k < s + t as otherwise the k-unit (p, q) lottery is a
single-price lottery. Each agent in T participates in a k-unit q-lottery in Lotq and only a (k−s)-unit
q-lottery in Lotp,q; its expected utility can only be smaller in the second case. Now consider i ∈ S.
Writing r = (k − s+ 1)/(t+ 1), we can upper bound the utility of an agent i in Lotp,q by
vi − rq − (1− r)p = (1− r)(vi − p) + r(vi − q) ≤ (vi − p) +
k
s+t · (vi − q),
which is the combined expected utility that the agent obtains from participating in both a k-unit
p-lottery (with s < k) and a k-unit q-lottery. ✷
Corollary 3.6 For every valuation profile v, there is a k-unit p-lottery with expected residual
surplus at least G(v)/2.
3.3 A Near-Optimal Prior-Free Money-Burning Mechanism
We now give a prior-free mechanism that O(1)-approximates the benchmark G. This mechanism
is motivated by the following observations. First, by Corollary 3.6, our mechanism only needs
to compete with k-unit p-lotteries. Second, if many agents make significant contributions to the
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optimal residual surplus, then we can use random sampling techniques to approximate the optimal
k-unit p-lottery. Third, if a few agents are single-handedly responsible for the residual surplus
obtained by the optimal k-unit p-lottery, then the k-unit Vickrey auction obtains a constant fraction
of the optimal residual surplus. The precise mechanism is as follows.
Definition 3.7 (Random Sampling Optimal Lottery (RSOL)) With a set S = {1, . . . , n} of
n agents and a supply of k identical units of an item, the Random Sampling Optimal Lottery
(RSOL) is the following mechanism.
1. Choose a subset S1 ⊂ S of the agents uniformly at random, and let S2 denote the rest of the
agents. Let p2 denote the price charged by the optimal k-unit p-lottery for S2.
2. With 50% probability, run a k-unit p2-lottery on S1.
3. Otherwise, run a k-unit Vickrey auction on S1.
We have deliberately avoided optimizing this mechanism in order to keep its description and
analysis as simple as possible.
Theorem 3.8 RSOL O(1)-approximates the benchmark G.
In our proof of Theorem 3.8, we use the following “Balanced Sampling Lemma” of Feige et al. [13]
to control the similarity between the random sample S1 chosen by RSOL and its complement S2.
Lemma 3.9 (Balanced Sampling Lemma [13]) Let S be a random subset of {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let
ni denote |S ∩ {1, 2, . . . , i}|. Then
Pr
[
ni ≤
3
4 i for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
∣∣n1 = 0] ≥ 910 .
Proof: (of Theorem 3.8). Fix a valuation profile v with v1 ≥ · · · ≥ vn and a supply k ≥ 1. For
clarity, we make no attempt to optimize the constants in the following analysis.
We analyze the performance of RSOL only when certain sampling events occur. For i =
1, 2, let Ei denote the event that agent i is included in the set Si. Clearly, Pr[E1 ∩ E2] = 1/4.
Conditioning on E1 ∩ E2, let E3 denote the event that the Balanced Sampling Lemma holds for the
sample S1\{1} when viewed as a subset of {2, 3, . . . , n}. Similarly, let E4 denote the event that the
Balanced Sampling Lemma holds for the sample S2\{2} when viewed as a subset of {1, 3, . . . , n}.
By the Principle of Deferred Decisions and the Union Bound, Pr[E3 ∩ E4|E1 ∩ E2] ≥ 4/5. Hence,
Pr
[
∩4i=1Ei
]
≥ 1/5. We prove a bound on the approximation ratio conditioned on the event ∩4i=1Ei;
since the mechanism always has nonnegative residual surplus, its unconditional approximation ratio
is at most 5 times as large.
Let ni and n¯i denote |S1 ∩ {1, 2, . . . , i}| and |S2 ∩ {1, 2, . . . , i}|, respectively. Since the event
∩4i=1Ei holds, we have
ni, n¯i ∈
[
1
6 i,
5
6 i
]
(3)
for every i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}, and also n1 = 1 and n¯1 = 0.
By Corollary 3.6, we only need to show that the expected residual surplus of the mechanism is
at least a constant fraction of that of the optimal k-unit p-lottery for v. For a subset T of agents
and a price p, let W (T, p) denote the residual surplus of the k-unit p-lottery for T . Letting nTi
14
denote |T ∩ {1, 2, . . . , i}| and di denote vi − vi+1 for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} (interpreting vn+1 = 0), for
every ℓ we obtain the following useful identity:
W (T, vℓ+1) =
min{k, nTℓ }
nTℓ

 ∑
i∈T∩{1,...,ℓ}
vi

−min{k, nTℓ } · vℓ+1 = min{k, n
T
ℓ }
nTℓ
ℓ∑
i=1
nTi di. (4)
Let vℓ∗+1 denote the optimal price for a k-unit p-lottery for v, and note that ℓ
∗ ≥ k. By (4),
the residual surplus of this optimal lottery is
W (S, vℓ∗+1) =
k
ℓ∗
ℓ∑
i=1
idi.
To analyze the expected residual surplus of RSOL, first suppose that it executes a k-unit p2-lottery
where p2 = vm+1 for some m. We then have
W (S2, p2) ≥W (S2, vℓ∗+1) =
min{k, n¯ℓ∗}
n¯ℓ∗
ℓ∗∑
i=1
n¯idi ≥
k
ℓ∗
ℓ∗∑
i=2
i
6
di ≥
W (S, vℓ∗+1)
6
− d1,
where the first inequality follows from the optimality of p2 for S2, the first equality follows from (4),
and the second inequality follows from (3). On the other hand, inequality (3) and a similar deriva-
tion shows that the price p2 is nearly as effective for S1:
W (S1, p2) =
min{k, nm}
nm
m∑
i=1
nidi ≥
(
1
5
·
min{k, n¯m}
n¯m
) m∑
i=1
n¯i
5
di =
W (S2, p2)
25
≥
W (S, vℓ∗+1)
150
− d1.
Finally, if the mechanism executes a k-unit Vickrey auction for S1, then it obtains residual
surplus at least v1 − v2 = d1 (since the first agent is in S1). Averaging the residual surplus from
the two cases proves that RSOL O(1)-approximates G. ✷
We can improve the approximation factor in Theorem 3.8 by more than an order of magnitude
by modifying RSOL and optimizing the proof. Obtaining an approximation factor less than 10,
say, appears to require a different approach.
4 Lower Bounds for Prior-Free Money-Burning Mechanisms
This section establishes a lower bound of 4/3 on the approximation ratio of every prior-free money-
burning mechanism. This implements the fourth step of the prior-free mechanism design template
outlined in the Introduction. Our proof follows from showing that there is a i.i.d. distribution F for
which the expected value of our benchmark G is a constant factor larger than the expected residual
surplus of an optimal mechanism for the distribution, such as OptF. This shows an inherent gap
in the prior-free analysis framework that will manifest itself in the approximation factor of every
prior-free mechanism.
Proposition 4.1 No prior-free money-burning mechanism has approximation ratio better than 4/3
with respect to the benchmark G, even for the special case of two agents and one unit of an item.
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Proof: Our plan to exhibit a distribution over valuations such that the expected residual surplus of
the Bayesian optimal mechanism is at most 3/4 times that of the expected value of the benchmark G.
It follows that, for every randomized mechanism, there exists a valuation profile v for which its
expected residual surplus is at most 3/4 times G(v).
Suppose there are two agents with valuations drawn i.i.d. from a standard exponential distri-
bution with density f(x) = e−x on [0,∞). There is a single unit of an item. This distribution has
constant hazard rate, so a lottery is an optimal mechanism (as is every mechanism that always
allocates the item and charges payments according to Lemma 2.1). The expected (residual) surplus
of this mechanism is 1.
To calculate the expected value of G(v), first note that for a valuation profile (v1, v2) with
v1 ≥ v2, the optimal (p, q)-lottery either chooses p = q = 0 or p = v2 and q = 0. Thus,
G(v) = max
{
v1+v2
2 , v1 −
v2
2
}
.
Next, note that (v1 + v2)/2 ≥ v1 − (v2/2) if and only if v1 ≤ 2v2.
Now condition on the smaller valuation v2 and write v1 = v2+x for x ≥ 0. Since the exponential
distribution is memoryless, x is exponentially distributed. Thus, E[G(v1, v2)|v2] can be computed
as follows (integrating over possible values for x ∈ [0,∞)):
E[G(v1, v2)|v2] =
∫ v2
0
(
v2 +
x
2
)
e−xdx+
∫ ∞
v2
(v2
2
+ x
)
e−xdx
= v2(1− e
−v2) + 12
(
1− (v2 + 1)e
−v2
)
+ v22 e
−v2 + (v2 + 1)e
−v2
= v2 +
1
2
(
1 + e−v2
)
.
The smaller value v2 is distributed according to an exponential distribution with rate 2. Inte-
grating out yields
E[G(v1, v2)] =
∫ ∞
0
(2e−2x)
(
x+ 12 +
1
2e
−x
)
dx
= 12 +
1
2 +
∫ ∞
0
e−3xdx
= 43 .
✷
For the special case of two agents and a single good, an appropriate mixture of a lottery and
the Vickrey auction is a 3/2-approximation of the benchmark G(v). Determining the best-possible
approximation ratio is an open question, even in the two agent, one unit special case.
Proposition 4.2 For two bidders and a single unit of an item, there is a prior-free mechanism
that 3/2-approximates the benchmark G.
Proof: Consider a valuation profile with v1 ≥ v2. If we run a Vickrey auction with probability 1/3
and a lottery with probability 2/3, then the expected residual surplus is
1
3 (v1 − v2) +
2
3
(
v1+v2
2
)
= 23v1 ≥
2
3 max
{
v1+v2
2 , v1 −
v2
2
}
= 23G(v).
✷
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5 Quantifying the Power of Transfers and Money-Burning
For the objective of surplus maximization, mechanisms with general transfers are clearly as pow-
erful as money-burning mechanisms, which in turn are as powerful as mechanisms without money.
This section quantifies the distance between the levels of this hierarchy by studying surplus approx-
imation in multi-unit auctions. Precisely, we call a class of mechanisms α-surplus maximizers if,
for every multi-unit auction problem, there is a mechanism in the class that obtains at least a 1/α
fraction of the full surplus for every valuation profile. For example, mechanisms with transfers are
1-surplus maximizers, because the VCG mechanism achieves full surplus in every multi-unit auction
problem. Mechanisms without transfers are (n/k)-surplus maximizers, since the expected surplus
of a k-unit lottery is k/n times the full surplus. One can show (details omitted) that mechanisms
without transfers are not significantly better than Θ(n/k)-surplus maximizers.
The interesting question is to identify the exact location of money-burning mechanisms between
these two extremes: what is the potential benefit of implementing monetary transfers in a system
that initially only supports money burning? We give a lower bound and a matching upper bound,
for all k and n.
Proposition 5.1 Money-burning mechanisms are Ω(1 + log nk )-surplus maximizers in k-unit auc-
tions.
Proof: By Yao’s Minimax Theorem, we only need to lower bound the surplus approximation
achieved by an optimal mechanism on a worst-case distribution over valuation profiles.
Fix k and draw n valuations i.i.d. from an exponential distribution (with density e−x on [0,∞)).
This distribution has constant hazard rate and so, by our results in Section 2, the k-unit lottery
maximizes the expected residual surplus. Since the expected valuation of every bidder is 1, the
expected (residual) surplus of this mechanism is k.
The expected value of the full surplus is that of the sum of the top k out of n i.i.d. samples
of an exponential distribution. A calculation shows that this expectation equals Θ(k(1 + log nk )),
completing the proof. ✷
Theorem 5.2 Money-burning mechanisms are O(1+log nk )-surplus maximizers in k-unit auctions.
Proof: Fix k and a valuation profile v with v1 ≥ · · · ≥ vn. Assume for simplicity that both k
and n are powers of 2. Our simple mechanism is as follows. First, choose a nonnegative integer j
uniformly at random, subject to k ≤ 2j ≤ n. Note that there are 1 + log2(n/k) possible choices
for j. Second, run a k-unit v2j+1-lottery, where we interpret vn+1 as zero.
Write V ∗ =
∑k
i=1 vi for the full surplus. For j ∈ {log2 k, . . . , log2 n}, let Rj denote the residual
surplus obtained by the mechanism for a given value of j. We claim that
E[Rj | j is chosen] ≥
{
V ∗
2 −
k
2vk+1 if j = log2 k
k
2 (v2j−1+1 − v2j+1) otherwise.
When j = log2 k, the residual surplus is exactly V
∗−kvk+1 ≥ (V
∗−kvk+1)/2. To justify the second
case, note that k units will be randomly allocated amongst the top 2j bidders at price v2j+1. Each
of these goods is allocated to one of the top 2j−1 of these bidders with 50% probability, and the
residual surplus contributed by such an allocation is at least v2j−1 − v2j+1 ≥ v2j−1+1 − v2j+1.
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Let R denote the residual surplus obtained by our mechanism. The following derivation com-
pletes the proof:
E[R] =
∑log2 n
j=log2 k
E[Rj | j is chosen] ·Pr[j is chosen]
≥ 11+log2(n/k)
(
V ∗
2 −
k
2vk+1 +
∑log2 n
j=1+log2 k
k
2 (v2j−1+1 − v2j+1)
)
= V
∗
2(1+log2(n/k))
.
✷
Since the mechanism in Theorem 5.2 is prior-free, we obtain the same (tight) guarantee for
every Bayesian optimal mechanism.
Corollary 5.3 For every i.i.d. distribution F, the expected residual surplus of the Bayesian optimal
mechanism for F obtains an Ω(1/(1 + log(n/k))) fraction of the expected full surplus.
Theorem 5.2 and Corollary 5.3 suggest that the cost of implementing money-burning payments
instead of (possibly expensive or infeasible) general transfers is relatively modest, provided an
optimal money-burning mechanism is used.
6 Conclusions
We phrased our analysis of the Bayesian setting in terms of feasible allocations (e.g., x ∈ X if
and only if
∑
i xi ≤ k for the k-unit auction problem); however, it applies more generally to
single-parameter agent problems where the service provider must pay an arbitrary cost c(x) for the
allocation x produced. Standard problems in this setting include fixed cost services, non-excludable
public goods, and multicast auctions [14]. The solution to these problems is again to maximize
the ironed virtual surplus, which in this context is the sum of the agents’ ironed virtual valuations
less the cost of providing the service,
∑
i ϑ¯i(vi)xi − c(x). This generalization also applies when the
agents’ valuations are independent but not identically distributed, i.e., agent i has ironed virtual
valuation function ϑ¯i(·).
Theorem 6.1 Given service cost c(·) and a valuation profile, v, drawn from distribution F =
F1 × · · · ×Fn with ironed virtual valuation (for utility) function ϑ¯i(·) for agent i, every mechanism
with allocation rule satisfying
1. x(v) ∈ argmaxx′
∑
i ϑ¯i(vi)xi − c(x
′) and
2. ddvi ϑ¯i(vi) = 0⇒
d
dvi
xi(vi) = 0
is optimal with respect to expected residual surplus.
Our results for the Bayesian problem also extend beyond dominant strategy mechanisms. The
well known revenue equivalence result [28] is popularly stated as: first price, second price (a.k.a.,
Vickrey), and all-pay auctions all achieve the same profit. Of course this applies to money burning
as well. While this paper emphasized the dominant strategy “second price” optimal auction, there
are also first-price and all-pay variants that achieve the same performance. The all-pay variant
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is especially interesting because of its potential usefulness for network problems. For example, in
network routing, all agents could attach a proof of a computational payment to their packets. The
routing protocol can then route the appropriate packets (depending on the amount of computational
payment) and drop the rest. There is no need for a round of bidding, a round of transmitting the
packets of winning agents, and a round of collecting payments.
One of our main results is in giving a benchmark based on the optimal mechanism for the
symmetric setting of i.i.d. agents and k-unit auctions. Another main result is in approximating this
benchmark with a prior-free mechanism. Can these techniques be generalized beyond symmetric
settings? In particular, the notion that agents’ private valuations may be paired with publicly
observable attributes allowed for prior-free mechanisms to approximate Bayesian mechanisms for
digital good auctions and non-identically distributed valuations [4]. Further, there has been some
limited success in prior-free optimal mechanism design with structured costs or feasible allocations
(e.g., [16] for multicast auctions and [23] for path auctions).
Our analyses and the prior-free template extend to k-unit auction problems beyond our objective
of residual surplus. Imagine the k-unit auction in an i.i.d. Bayesian setting where the optimal
solution is characterized by optimizing an ironed virtual value for some quantity other than utility.
For example, the “virtual valuation for a 8% government sales tax”, to optimize the value of the
agents and mechanism less the tax deducted by government, would be ϕ(v) = 0.92v − 0.081−F (v)f(v) .
The optimal k-unit (p, q)-lottery is still the appropriate benchmark. Furthermore, as long as the
optimal (p, q)-lottery makes use of prices p, q bounded above by the second highest bid, v(2), as in
the money-burning context, then it is likely that our prior-free mechanism, RSOL, can be employed
to approximate the benchmark. Notice that when applying this technique to “virtual valuations
for payments”, which are the appropriate notion of virtual valuations for the objective of profit
maximization, the optimal k-unit (p, q)-lottery is simply a posted price at p. Furthermore, the
optimal posted price might satisfy p = v(1) ≫ v(2). As it is not possible to approximate such a
benchmark to within any constant factor, the prior-free digital goods auction literature excludes
this possibility by defining the benchmark to be the profit of the optimal posted price p ≤ v(2).
In our work there was an implicit, publicly known, exchange rate for money burnt. In network
settings, where burnt payments correspond to degraded service quality or computational payments,
the designer may not know each agent’s relative disutility for such payments. This motivates
considering the more general setting where agents have a private value for burnt money in addition
to their private value for service. This moves the problem from a single-parameter setting to
the much more challenging multi-parameter setting where optimal mechanism design has very few
positive results.
There are additionally a few loose ends to tie up with the particular question of money-burning.
For k-unit auctions, can we give tighter upper and lower bounds for prior-free money-burning
mechanisms with a small number of agents? For general settings beyond i.i.d. distributions and
k-unit auctions, can we quantify the power of money burning?
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A Proof of Lemma 2.8
Our proof of Lemma 2.8 is based on the following lemma.
Lemma A.1 For every monotone allocation rule xi(v),
Ev[ϑ(vi)xi(v)] = Ev
[
ϑ¯(vi)xi(v)
]
−
∫ b
a
[H(F (vi))−G(F (vi))] xi
′(vi)dvi.
Proof: Recall that xi(vi) is the probability of allocating to agent i with their value is vi and other
agents’ values are distributed according to F: xi(vi) = Ev−i [xi(vi,v−i)] . We use xi
′(vi) to denote
the derivative of xi(vi) with respect to vi.
By the definition of g and h in Definition 2.7, ϑ(vi) = ϑ¯(vi) + h(F (vi))− g(F (vi)) for every vi.
Hence,
Ev[ϑ(vi)xi(v)] = Ev
[
ϑ¯(vi)xi(v)
]
+Ev[(h(F (vi))− g(F (vi))) xi(v)] . (5)
Since F is a product distribution, the second term satisfies
Ev[(h(F (vi))− g(F (vi)))xi(v)] =
∫
v
(h(F (vi))− g(F (vi))) xi(v)f(v)dv
=
∫ b
a
(h(F (vi))− g(F (vi))) xi(vi)f(vi)dvi. (6)
Now, integrate by parts to obtain
Ev[(h(F (vi))− g(F (vi)))xi(v)] = [H(F (vi))−G(F (vi))] xi(vi)
∣∣∣b
a
−
∫ b
a
[H(F (vi))−G(F (vi))] xi
′(vi)dvi
= −
∫ b
a
[H(F (vi))−G(F (vi))] xi
′(vi)dvi. (7)
Equation (7) follows from the fact that, as the convex hull of H(·) on interval (0, 1), G(·) satisfies
G(0) = H(0) and G(1) = H(1). Combining this with equation (5) gives the lemma. ✷
Now we restate and prove our main technical lemma for Bayesian optimal money-burning
mechanisms.
Lemma 2.8 Let F be a distribution function with virtual valuation function ϑ(·) and x(v) a
monotone allocation rule. Define G, H, and ϑ¯ as in Definition 2.7. Then
Ev[ϑ(vi)xi(v)] ≤ Ev
[
ϑ¯(vi)xi(v)
]
,
with equality holding if and only if ddvxi(v) = 0 whenever G(F (v)) < H(F (v)).
Proof: Again, let xi
′(v) = ddvxi(v) be the derivative of xi(v). From Lemma A.1,
Ev[ϑ(vi)xi(v)] = Ev
[
ϑ¯(vi)xi(v)
]
−
∫ b
a
[H(F (vi))−G(F (vi))] xi
′(vi)dvi. (8)
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Since G is the convex hull of H, G ≤ H on [a, b]. Since x is a monotone allocation rule, its derivative
is nonnegative. The integral on the right-hand side of (8) is therefore nonnegative. If xi
′(vi) 6= 0
only when G(F (vi)) = H(F (vi)), then the integral vanishes. Conversely, since G and H (and hence
H − G) are continuous, if xi
′(vi) > 0 at a point where G(F (vi)) < H(F (vi)), then the integral is
strictly positive. ✷
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